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SATU KRIPTOSISTEM KEKUNCI-AWAM VISUAL BARU YANG 
BERASASKAN TEKNIK TAK BERKEMBANG DAN OPERASI BOOLEAN  
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Banyak kriptosistem kunci-awam digunakan dalam kehidupan seharian kita, 
contohnya untuk kegunaan privasi, autentik, dan integriti. Namun demikian, 
kebanyakan algoritma kunci-awam yang sedia ada adalah berdasarkan kepada 
komputan matematik kompleks. Sehingga kini, binaan kriptosistem kunci-awam 
dengan ciri-ciri keselamatan yang tinggi tanpa menggunakan komputan kompleks 
merupakan suatu cabaran yang serius, yang memerlukan suatu kaedah kriptografi 
baru dibangunkan. Kriptografi visual adalah istimewa kerana skemanya yang 
memerlukan pemeriksaan visual, yang mana setara dengan komputan Boolean yang 
ringkas; seterusnya menyebabkan komputan kompleks tidak diperlukan. Reka bentuk 
asas kriptografi visual menggunakan sistem visual manusia, untuk memulihkan imej-
rahsia. Di samping itu, proses pemeriksaan visual boleh dilakukan dengan lebih 
mudah oleh manusia, tetapi sukar untuk komputer menirunya. Keadaan ini secara 
tidak langsung memberikan perlindungan tambahan pada skema visual terhadap 
serangan “brute-force” pada kunci-rahsia visual. Walau bagaimanapun, kriptografi 
visual semasa hanyalah tertumpu kepada kriptografi kunci-rahsia. Oleh itu, dalam 
kajian ini, primitif kunci-awam alternatif dicadangkan, berdasarkan kriptografi visual 
tak-berkembang dan operasi Boolean. Kriptosistem visual yang dicadangkan 
termasuklah: protokol pertukaran kunci visual, protokol tandatangan digital visual, 
dan bukti identiti protokol tanpa-pengetahuan visual. Keselamatan protokol kunci-
awam visual yang dicadangkan, dijamin oleh masalah K-SAT NP-hard dan masalah 
matriks tidak songsang (non-invertible matrix) yang tiada penyelesaiannya. Analisis 
xv 
 
keselamatan menunjukkan bahawa kriptosistem kunci-awam visual adalah selamat, 
terutamanya apabila digunakan dengan saiz imej-bayang (kongsi tampak) yang 
besar. Masa diperlukan untuk “brute-force” nilai-rahsia (kunci-rahsia visual) 
bertambah secara eksponen dengan bertambahnya saiz imej-bayang. Potensi 
kegunaan yang luas, pengkhususan pada aplikasi visual, pelaksanaan imej-bayang 
yang mudah, membuatkan kriptosistem kunci-awam visual yang dicadangkan 
merupakan suatu alternatif yang sesuai kepada kriptosistem kunci-awam klasik yang 
sedia ada pada hari ini. 
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A NEW VISUAL PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON NON-
EXPANSION TECHNIQUE AND BOOLEAN OPERATIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Many public-key cryptosystems are used in our daily lives to attain privacy, 
authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. However, most of the existing public-key 
algorithms are based on complex mathematical computations. Until recently, 
building a highly secured public-key cryptosystem without utilizing complex 
computations has been a serious challenge, making it necessary for investigations to 
develop new cryptography methods. Visual cryptography is special because the 
scheme requires visual inspection or the equivalence of simple Boolean computation 
and therefore, does not require complex computations. The basic design of visual 
cryptography exploits the human visual system, to recover secret images. Moreover, 
the visual inspection process could be carried out very easily by humans, but hard for 
the computer to imitate. Indirectly, such scheme adds extra protection to the visual 
scheme against brute-force search on the visual secret key. However, visual 
cryptography currently exists only for secret-key cryptography. Therefore, in the 
current study, alternative public-key primitives are proposed, based on non-
expansion visual cryptography and Boolean operations. The proposed visual 
cryptosystem include: visual key exchange protocol, visual digital signature protocol 
and visual zero-knowledge proof of identity protocol. The security of the proposed 
visual public-key protocols is assured by the K-SAT NP-hard problem and non-
solvable of the non-invertible matrix problem. Security analyses showed that the 
proposed visual public-key cryptosystem is secure, especially when used with large 
sizes of shadow images (visual shares). The time required to brute-force the secret 
xvii 
 
values (visual secret keys) increased exponentially with the increase in the size of 
shadow images. The wide potential use, specific niche on visual applications, 
simplicity and ease of implementation of shadow images, therefore makes the 
proposed visual public-key cryptosystem a suitable alternative to the classical public-
key cryptosystems that are currently in use today. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.0 General Overview 
 
Today digital information can be distributed via the Internet to a large number 
of people in an easy and simple way. Information security is a field that protects and 
secures sensitive digital information and its systems from unauthorized access, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. Information security provides 
many services such as data confidentiality, authentication, data integrity and non-
repudiation in order to keep the distribution of sensitive digital information and its 
systems works reliably (Ozturk and Sogukpinar, 2005; Anoop, 2007; Chan and Wu, 
2008; Information Security, 2010).  
Cryptography is one of the trusted practical methods for performing 
information security. The main purpose of cryptography is to provide confidentiality 
by converting the sensitive private information (known as plaintext) into unreadable 
and useless form (known as ciphertext). Figure 1.1 shows different classifications of 
cryptography such as quantum cryptography, chaos cryptography, conventional 
cryptography and visual cryptography. In this study we focused only on the 
conventional (especially public-key) cryptography and visual cryptography. 
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Figure 1.1: Main classifications of cryptography
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There are, in general, two main types of conventional cryptography, secret-
key cryptography and public-key cryptography (refer to Figure 1.1). These two types 
are controlled by keys and some of the primitives are based on complex 
mathematical concepts. 
Secret-key cryptography which is also known as symmetric-key 
cryptography, uses the same key for both encryption and decryption (refer to Figure 
1.2). Secret-key algorithms can be classified into two main types: block ciphers and 
stream ciphers (refer to Figure 1.1). A block cipher splits the plaintext message into 
consecutive blocks, where each block has the same block size (normally 128 bits), 
and then encrypt each block with the same key. While a stream cipher divides the 
plaintext message into consecutive characters (byte or sometimes unit larger than a 
byte) or bits and then encrypts each character or bit with one element of the key 
stream. 
 
Secret Key
PlaintextCiphertext
Secret Key
Plaintext
Secret-Key 
Encryption 
Algorithm
Secret-Key 
Decryption 
Algorithm
 
 
Figure 1.2: The concept of secret-key cryptography 
 
Public-key cryptography is also known as asymmetric-key cryptography that 
has been suggested for solving the key distribution problem in the secret-key 
cryptography. Unlike secret-key cryptography, public-key cryptography does not use 
the same key to encrypt and decrypt a message. Instead, public-key cryptography 
uses two different keys but related mathematically; the public key which is known to 
everyone is used for encryption, and the corresponding private key which is kept 
4 
 
secret is used for decryption (refer to Figure 1.3). In addition, it is computationally 
infeasible to derive the private key from the public key (Ragab, 2004; Yahya, 2004; 
Amador et al., 2005; Stallings, 2006; Kessler, 2010). As shown in Figure 1.1, public-
key cryptography can be classified into four main categories (Abhijit and Madhavan, 
2009): key exchange, encryption, digital signature, and zero-knowledge proof of 
identity. In this research, we are focusing only on the public-key cryptography and its 
main categories as shown in Figure 1.1. A good explanation to public-key 
cryptography and its main types can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
Public Key
PlaintextCiphertext
Private Key
Plaintext
Public-Key
Encryption 
Algorithm
Public-Key
Decryption 
Algorithm
 
 
Figure 1.3: The concept of public-key encryption 
 
Visual cryptography is a special type of cryptography for images (refer to 
Figure 1.1), in which it is based on the pixel level manipulation with Boolean 
operations (Hawkes et al., 2000; Fischer and Herfet, 2006; Pejaś and Zawalich, 
2008). Visual cryptography is also known as the art of hiding pictures amongst other 
pictures (Busse, 2003).  
The basic theory of visual cryptography was first introduced by Naor and 
Shamir in 1994 (Naor and Shamir, 1995) with their paper “Visual Cryptography”. 
They proposed a perfectly safe method to solve the problem of encrypting written 
material (printed text, handwritten, notes, pictures, etc.) (Jessica, 2005). 
The visual cryptography method divides the secret image into a set of shares 
(refer to Figure 1.4) and distributes those shares to participants. The secret image is 
5 
 
decrypted by using the properties of the human visual system without the need for 
complicated computations or mathematical primitives (Naor and Shamir, 1995; 
Biham and Itzkovitz, 1998; Jessica, 2005; Chan and Wu, 2008; Abdulla, 2010). Note 
that, pattern recognition by human visual system is a highly complex operation but 
can be done very casually by humans. The secret data seem to appear immediately 
when all or several of those transparency shares are stacked together according to the 
visual cryptography scheme used (Chan and Wu, 2008). The reconstruction secret 
image in visual cryptography schemes needs only the very simple Boolean „OR‟ 
computation on the transparent shares which is done automatically by the human eye, 
while in the classical cryptographic systems, complex computer operations are 
required, comparatively. 
  
USM
… …
Ciphertext
Image
Shares (Shadow images)
Plaintext
USM
Plaintext
Recovered image
Encryption: 
Creating shares 
(by a computer)
Decryption: 
Superposition of 
shares (verified 
by eye inspection)
 
Figure 1.4: The concept of visual cryptography for black-and-white image 
 
 The characteristics of visual cryptography are (Yan et al., 2004; Patel, 2003): 
 Simple to implement. 
 Perfect security. 
 The encryption does not need complex computations. 
 The decryption can be done by human visual system (human eye) 
without any complex computations and without the assistance of a 
computing device. 
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The most important characteristic of the visual cryptography is the ability to 
recover the secret image without any calculations. It utilizes the human visual system 
to recover the secret image from some or all overlapping shares, therefore 
overcoming the drawback of the complex calculations needed in the conventional 
cryptographic systems (Hou, 2003). Note that the image recognition done by the 
human visual system is highly complex for a computer to imitate. 
As shown in Figure 1.1, visual cryptography can be classified into two main 
models (types): conventional visual cryptography and non-expansion visual 
cryptography. A good explanation to visual cryptography and its main types can be 
found in Chapter 2. 
Steganography is one of the trusted practical methods for performing 
information security. It is actually about finding the best place to hide an object in a 
way that is not recognized by others and at the same time does not affect the place 
that keeps the object. The word “Steganography” comes from Greek, which literally 
means “covered” or “hidden writing”. This lies in contrast to cryptography, where 
the enemy is allowed to detect, intercept and modify messages without being able to 
violate certain security premises guaranteed by a cryptosystem. The goal of 
steganography is to hide messages inside other harmless messages in a way that does 
not allow any enemy to even detect that there is a second secret message present 
(Johnson et al., 2001; Jaafar, 2003). Even though there are many implementations of 
steganography on the image domain, the fact is that visual cryptography and 
steganography are two sides of a coin. Steganography hides the existence of hidden 
data whereas the visual cryptography has the nature of revealing the existence of the 
hidden data (Jithesh and Senthil, 2010). Therefore, the work in this study is not 
related to steganography. 
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1.1 Motivation 
 
The design of our research is motivated by the following points: 
1. The existence of visual cryptography for sharing and encrypting images. 
Visual cryptography uses human visual system (human eye) to recover the 
secret without any complex decryption algorithms.  
2. There is a need to construct new functional public-key cryptosystem, in 
which human visual system plays an important role in the decryption process.  
3. Although there are many existing researches on secret-key visual 
cryptography, but there is no public-key visual cryptography research at the 
moment. 
4. Use freely available but highly complex human visual system for decryption. 
Although humans cannot perform highly complex computations, but the 
human visual system can easily perform pattern recognition task which is a 
highly complex operation if it has to be done by a computer. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
  
This research aims to answer the following questions: 
 Can we achieve public-key concept for visual cryptography? 
 Is non-expansion visual cryptography with Boolean operations can be used in 
public-key visual cryptography? 
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1.3 Research Problem 
 
We conduct this study due to the importance of public-key cryptosystems in 
everyday life to attain and ensure privacy, authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation 
of electronic information exchanges in the sphere of network communication. 
The security of most currently available public-key cryptosystems is based on 
hard mathematical (difficulty number-theoretic) problems such as discrete logarithms 
in finite groups or integer factorization that require complex and heavy cryptographic 
computations. In general the two communicating parties must depend on high and 
powerful computing device (computer) to perform these computations. Until now, 
building a public-key cryptosystem with high security and without complex 
cryptographic computations has been a great challenge. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate new public-key cryptography primitives that require less complex 
cryptographic computations but relatively secure. 
In this thesis, we proposed a new public-key cryptosystem with 
comparatively low and simple computations. The proposed public-key primitives are 
based on non-expansion visual cryptography and Boolean operations for overcoming 
the complex computations.  
 
1.4 Research Scope 
  
Our study in this thesis focuses on visual public-key cryptosystem (i.e., visual 
key exchange, visual digital signature, and visual zero-knowledge proof of identity) 
which have special advantages as we will mention in the following chapters. The 
scope of this research is limited to applying the concepts of the non-expansion visual 
cryptography and Boolean operations on the public-key concept for producing a new 
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model of visual public-key cryptosystem with a comparatively less complex 
computation.  
 
1.5 Research Objective 
 
Since the Boolean operation is simple, fast and very adaptive to visual 
cryptography, our proposed methods will use simple Boolean computations instead 
of complex and heavy cryptographic computations. Instead of generating and 
computing large and long random integer values and manipulating them by using 
computational heavy and complex operations as in the classical public-key 
cryptosystems, our methods in this study generates shadow images called visual 
shares and manipulates them by using simple Boolean operations. 
In this study, we aim to combine the advantages of the non-expansion visual 
cryptography and Boolean operations with the concept of the public-key 
cryptography for overcoming the problems as stated in Section 1.3 and then 
producing a new public-key cryptosystem that requires less complex computations. 
The primary objectives of our research are: 
 To introduce alternative methods to the classical public-key primitives based 
on non-expansion visual cryptography concept and Boolean operations with a 
comparatively low and simple computation. 
 To assess the security of the proposed visual public-key cryptosystem which 
is based on the strength and the performance of the proposed visual public-
keys algorithms. 
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1.6 Research Methodology 
 
To achieve the objectives as stated in Section 1.5, this research follows the 
following research methodology: 
 Perform a literature survey on the public-key cryptography and on the visual 
cryptography. 
 Introduce new public-key primitives which are based on the idea of non-
expansion visual cryptography and Boolean operations, as follows: 
1. Introduce a new key exchange algorithm based on non-expansion 
visual cryptography and Boolean operations. 
2. Introduce a new digital signature algorithm based on non-expansion 
visual cryptography and Boolean operation. 
3. Introduce a new zero-knowledge proof of identity algorithm based on 
non-expansion visual cryptography and Boolean operation. 
 Perform security analysis and calculate computational complexity for the 
proposed visual public-key cryptosystem. 
 Compare the proposed visual public-key cryptosystem with the current 
standard in public-key cryptosystems. 
A general block diagram of the proposed method is shown in Figure 1.5. 
Figure 1.6 shows the main types of public-key cryptography and the proposed visual 
public-key cryptosystem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: General block diagram of the proposed method 
Non-Expansion Visual Cryptography 
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Figure 1.6: Main branches of public-key cryptography and the proposed visual public-key cryptosystem
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1.7 Research Contribution 
 
In general, this research has two main contributions. The first contribution is 
the introduction of the public-key visual cryptography model. The second 
contribution is the design and implementation of the new approaches to the visual 
public-key cryptosystem which are based on the non-expansion visual cryptography 
and Boolean operations. The outcome of this study is a new concept of public-key 
primitives cryptosystem which uses the human visual system for decryption without 
the need to rely on complex, heavy computations. 
The proposed visual public-key cryptosystem in this study depends on 
Boolean computation, which is fast, simple and highly adaptable to visual 
cryptography. The proposed visual public-key cryptosystem have great impact on the 
field of information security and have a wide potential usage especially on visual 
based applications. 
Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis contain specification and explanation of the 
new visual public-key protocols and comparison between these protocols with the 
classical public-key algorithms. Additionally, an encryption scheme using the visual 
key exchange protocol (the proposed first protocol) and existing non-expansion 
visual cryptography is proposed. Such visual encryption scheme hypothetically 
should run faster than a dedicated visual public-key encryption protocol, as currently 
found in the conventional cryptosystem. 
 
1.8 Thesis Organization 
 
The work conducted in this thesis is organized in seven chapters with 
appendices. This chapter provides an introduction to the work by giving a brief 
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overview of the related concepts, the motivations, the problem, the questions, the 
scope, the objectives, the methodology and the contributions of this study. 
In Chapter 2, we give an overview of the concepts of public-key cryptography 
and visual cryptography. The public-key cryptography is classified into four 
categories: key exchange, encryption, digital signature, and zero-knowledge proof of 
identity. The visual cryptography is classified into two models, conventional visual 
cryptography model, and non-expansion (probabilistic) visual cryptography model. 
The schemes of visual cryptography for every model are discussed in detail as well.  
In Chapter 3, we explain the ideas of our new protocols as a new key 
exchange, a new digital signature and a new zero-knowledge proof of identity, based 
on the non-expansion visual cryptography and Boolean operations. In addition, we 
explain a new encryption scheme based on the visual key exchange protocol and the 
non-expansion visual cryptography. 
Chapter 4 presents the security analysis and computational complexity 
analysis of our new visual public-key protocols. Brief performance comparisons 
between our new visual public-key protocols with the well-known conventional 
public-key algorithms are presented in this chapter. In addition, this chapter presents 
the security analysis and computational complexity of the new visual encryption 
scheme and also gives a brief performance comparison between the conventional 
encryption scheme and the proposed visual encryption scheme. Knowledge 
contribution of the research will also be explained. 
Finally, Chapter 5 gives the conclusion and the future work for this study. 
The conclusion depends on the results which we have obtained through the 
implementation of the study to be clarified and summarized for the reader. 
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In Appendices A and B we gave some experimental examples which are used 
to help the reader to understand the work of conventional and non-expansion visual 
cryptography models. Appendix C gave basic information on invertible and non-
invertible matrices and Appendix D gave basic information on K-satisfiability (K-
SAT) problems especially the 3-SAT and 4-SAT cases. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.0 Introduction  
 
The focus of this chapter is to review and discuss topics relevant to the 
current research work. In the first part of this chapter, an overview of public-key 
cryptography and its categories is provided. Thereafter, an introduction on the 
concept of visual cryptography is given, describing the visual cryptography models 
and techniques from the literature. 
This chapter is organized into four main sections, based on the literature 
survey of the public-key and visual cryptography. Section 2.1 provides the definition 
and purpose of public-key cryptography. Section 2.1 is further divided into 
subsections. These subsections explain and discuss the categories of public-key 
(asymmetric-key) cryptography, namely; the key exchange, the public-key 
encryption, the digital signature and the zero-knowledge proof of identity. Section 
2.2 concentrates on the definition and purpose of visual cryptography. This section is 
also divided into subsections, which review the types of visual cryptography models 
with their schemes for black-and-white (binary) images and illustrates the important 
applications of visual cryptography. In Section 2.3, a brief comparison between the 
public-key cryptography and visual cryptography is made. Finally, Section 2.4 
provides a summary for the chapter. 
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2.1 Public-Key (Asymmetric-Key) Cryptography 
 
Public-key cryptography is one of the key contributions in the history of 
cryptography. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) introduced 
the first concept of public-key (asymmetric-key) cryptography, to solve the problem 
of key exchange, which is associated with secret-key (symmetric-key) cryptography. 
Public-key cryptography has a pair of keys; one key is known as the public key 
which is publically known by the public and  another key is the private key which is 
kept secret by the owner (Jaafar and Samsudin, 2010a; RSA Laboratories, 2010). 
Using public-key cryptography mechanism, all communications between two parties 
over an open network involves only the public keys, without the need for the 
exchange of any private keys (Anoop, 2007).  
 In recent times, public-key cryptosystems are being used in everyday life, to 
attain privacy, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation in the sphere of network 
communications (Chen, 2004; Laih and Chen, 2004; Stallings, 2006). Currently, 
most public-key algorithms are based on the difficulty to compute and solve hard 
mathematical problems which require computationally heavy and complex 
operations (Aladdin R&D Team, 2000; Lenstra, 2006). Additionally, these problems 
can be classified into two main categories based on their running time, Polynomial 
(P) time and Non-deterministic Polynomial (NP) time. The problem is said to be in P 
if it can be solved by deterministic algorithm in polynomial time, whereas it is in NP 
if it can be solved by nondeterministic algorithm in polynomial time (Menezes et al., 
1996; RSA Laboratories, 2010).  
Figure 2.1 shows the most important, conventional public-key cryptography 
which can be categorized into key exchange, public-key encryption, digital signature 
and zero-knowledge proof of identity; where each category includes many different 
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algorithms. The following subsections discuss and explain each category of the 
public-key cryptography with practical examples.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Major categories of public-key cryptography 
 
 
2.1.1 Key Exchange 
 
The first important method in public-key cryptography is key exchange which 
ensures the confidential construction of a shared secret key between two parties, in 
real-time and on an open network. A shared secret key could enable two parties, who 
may not have had any previous communication, to encrypt their communications 
(Carts, 2001; Palmgren, 2005).  
 
2.1.1.1 Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange Protocol 
 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) proposed an 
interesting protocol, the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol, to ensure 
secure communications without the need of exchanging secret data. In this regards, 
they amazed the computer security world in 1976 with their paper “New Directions 
in Cryptography”, which introduced the idea of public-key cryptography (Diffie and 
Hellman, 1976; Hellman, 1978; Ford, 1994; Palmgren, 2005; Stallings, 2006).  
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 The DH key exchange protocol was fundamentally different from all other 
previous cryptography methods for two major reasons. First, it uses two different 
keys, namely; public and private keys which are mathematically linked, instead of 
one shared secret key commonly used in symmetric-key cryptography. Second, it is 
based on mathematical problems which require heavy cryptographic computations, 
instead of substitution and permutation (Carts, 2001; Xue, 2007). 
 The DH key exchange protocol begins when each of the parties (users A and 
B) generates a private key. Each party then generates the corresponding public key. 
Note that the public key is derived from the private key, and the two keys are 
mathematically linked. The two parties then exchange their public keys. Each party 
now has its own private key and the other party‟s public key. So, the two parties can 
compute a unique shared key, which is known only to both of them. In order to have 
confidence in this scheme, it must be accepted that it is computationally impossible 
to derive the private key from the public key (Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Hellman, 
1978; Ford, 1994; Palmgren, 2005; Stallings, 2006). 
 Suppose that the users A and B (Alice and Bob) want to exchange a key 
between them. The DH key exchange protocol (refer to Figure 2.2) works as follows 
(Diffie and Hellman, 1976): 
Initial parameters: Alice and Bob agree on two publicly known parameters: a prime 
number P and an integer G, which is a primitive root of P. 
The protocol: It consists of the following two stages. 
1. First stage: Alice builds her public key and Bob builds his public key. Below are 
the details of this stage, which is performed simultaneously by Alice and Bob. 
Steps generated by user A (Alice) 
 Chooses a random private integer, 𝑋𝐴 < 𝑃.  
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 Calculates her public key 𝑌𝐴, as follows: 𝑌𝐴 = 𝐺
𝑋𝐴  mod 𝑃.  
 Sends her public key 𝑌𝐴 to Bob. 
Steps generated by user B (Bob) 
 Chooses a random private integer, 𝑋𝐵 < 𝑃.  
 Calculates his public key YB , as follows: 𝑌𝐵 = 𝐺
𝑋𝐵  mod 𝑃.  
  Sends his public key 𝑌𝐵  to Alice. 
 
2. Second stage: Alice calculates the shared secret key 𝐾𝐴 and Bob calculates the 
shared secret key 𝐾𝐵 , where 𝐾𝐴 and 𝐾𝐵  are identical keys. Below are the details of 
this stage for Alice and Bob. 
Steps generated by user A (Alice) 
 Receive Bob‟s public key 𝑌𝐵 . 
 Calculates the shared secret key 𝐾𝐴, as follows: 𝐾𝐴 = (𝑌𝐵)
𝑋𝐴  mod 𝑃. 
Steps generated by user B (Bob) 
 Receive Alice‟s public key 𝑌𝐴. 
 Calculates the shared secret key KB , as follows: 𝐾𝐵 = (𝑌𝐴)
𝑋𝐵  mod 𝑃. 
  
Figure 2.2 shows the work of conventional Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol. 
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Figure 2.2: The conventional Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol (adapted from 
Ford, 1994) 
  
 DH key exchange is an interesting and widespread protocol which is 
accessible in numerous connectivity protocols. At a time when the lifespan of old 
technologies are calculated in months, this protocol is almost celebrating its 34
th
 
anniversary and is still playing an active role in important Internet protocols. The 
security of the DH key exchange protocol is established under the assumption that 
calculating discrete logarithms is a hard problem. The task of calculating discrete 
logarithms for large prime numbers is considered unfeasible, where the large prime 
numbers exceed 1024 bits (Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Carts, 2001; Rothe, 2005; 
Stallings, 2006; Elaine et al., 2006). 
 
Example 2.1 This is a working example of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol with small numbers. In this example, Alice and Bob agree to use a prime 
number  𝑝 = 23 and an integer 𝐺 = 5. Alice generates her private number 𝑋𝐴 = 6, 
and computes 𝑌𝐴 = 𝐺
𝑋𝐴  mod 𝑝 = 56  mod 23 = 8, then sends Bob 𝑌𝐴 = 8. Similarly, 
Bob generates his private number 𝑋𝐵 = 15, and computes 𝑌𝐵 = 𝐺
𝑋𝐵  mod 𝑝 =
515  mod 23 = 19, then sends Alice 𝑌𝐵 = 19. After that, Alice calculates 𝐾𝐴 =
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𝑌𝐵
𝑋𝐴  mod 𝑝 = 196 mod 23 = 2. Similarly, Bob calculates 𝐾𝐵 = 𝑌𝐴
𝑋𝐵  mod 𝑝 =
815  mod 23 = 2. Note that both Alice and Bob have arrived at the same value 
(𝐾 = 𝐾𝐴 = 𝐾𝐵). 
 In real implementation, normally, the shared secret key that is being 
established by DH key exchange protocol is used to encrypt and decrypt the 
subsequent communications using faster symmetric-key (secret-key) cipher. 
 
2.1.2 Public-Key Encryption 
 
 The public-key encryption is one of the main branches and applications of the 
public-key cryptography proposed in 1976 by Diffie-Hellman (Diffie and Hellman, 
1976). Public-key encryption allows two parties to communicate securely over an 
insecure channel, without having prior knowledge of each other to establish a shared 
secret key. Using public-key encryption mechanism, all communications between 
two parties over an unprotected channel involves only public keys and without the 
need for exchanging the private (secret) key (Anoop, 2007). Public-key encryption 
depends on two different keys, but which are mathematically linked. The first key, 
the public key, is put in a public and used for encryption while the second key is the 
private (secret) key, which is kept secret and used for decryption. In addition, it is 
computationally difficult to derive the private key from the public key (Hellman, 
1978; Amador et al., 2005; Stallings, 2006; Xue, 2007). In the process of encryption, 
the sender encrypts his or her confidential information in such a way that only the 
intended recipient can decrypt the confidential information (Anoop, 2007; Jaafar and 
Samsudin, 2010a). 
 Figure 2.3 shows the concept of public-key encryption technique. For this 
system, suppose that the receiver, Bob, has private and public keys, which are (PRR) 
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and (PUR) respectively. The receiver‟s public key (PUR) is publicly known, used for 
encryption and the receiver‟s private key (PRR) is kept secret, used for decryption. 
Suppose that the sender, Alice, wants to send an original secret message (SM) to the 
receiver (Bob), Alice (the sender) encrypts her secret message (SM) using Bob‟s 
public key (PUR) to get the encrypted secret message, which is known as cipher 
message (CM), and sends it to Bob (the receiver). The receiver (Bob) could thus 
decrypt the cipher message (CM) by using only his private key (PRR).   
 
CM = Encrypt (SM, PUR) SM = Decrypt (CM, PRR)
Secret 
Message 
(SM)
Public Key = PUR
Private Key = PRR
Secret 
Message 
(SM)
Sender (Alice)                                    Open network                                  Receiver (Bob)
Bob sends his public key (PUR) to Alice
Alice sends the cipher message (CM) to Bob
Decryption 
Algorithm
Encryption 
Algorithm
  
Figure 2.3: The concept of public-key encryption technique 
  
 
 Some public-key encryption algorithms are popular, for example; RSA, 
ElGamal and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptograph). The RSA public-key encryption 
algorithm invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1977 and was published in 
1978 (Rivest et al., 1978) is the first practical encryption algorithm, based on the 
concept of the public-key cryptography. ElGamal public-key encryption algorithm 
(ElGamal, 1985) and elliptic curve public-key encryption algorithm (Koblitz, 1987) 
on the other hand are among the popular public-key encryption algorithms published 
after the RSA. The security of most of the public-key encryption algorithms is based 
on discrete logarithms in finite groups or integer factorization (Laih and Chen, 2004; 
Amador et al., 2005; Stallings, 2006). 
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2.1.2.1 The RSA Public-Key Encryption Algorithm 
 
The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) is one of the most widely used public-
key encryption algorithm. The security of the RSA algorithm is based on the 
difficulty of factoring large primes. Normally, 1024-2048 bits lengths of numbers are 
used, which make the computation very expansive. With the 1024-2048 bits key, the 
RSA is considered secure against brute force attack (Rivest et al., 1978; Stallings, 
2006; Elaine et al., 2006; Alia, 2008). Figure 2.4 shows the RSA public-key 
encryption protocol.  
 
Decryption 
m = cd mod n
d = e-1 mod Φ(n)
Φ(n) = (p – 1) × (q – 1)
e
n = p × q
p q
Encryption 
c = me mod n
Message
m
Sender (Alice)                     Open network                       Receiver (Bob)
(n, e)
c
 
 
Figure 2.4: RSA public-key encryption protocol 
 
 
 Typically, the RSA public-key encryption algorithm consists of three phases, 
as follows: 
1. A key generation phase: In this phase, the receiver (Bob) generates the public 
key (𝑛, 𝑒) and the corresponding private key (𝑛, 𝑑). The details of this phase are 
as follows: 
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 Generate randomly, two large prime numbers (𝑝, 𝑞) which are secret and of 
roughly the same length in bits, but which must not be equal and not close to 
each other. 
 Compute; 𝑛 = 𝑝 × 𝑞, where 𝑛 is the product of the two prime numbers 
(𝑝, 𝑞). 
 Compute; 𝛷(𝑛) = (𝑝 − 1) × (𝑞 − 1). 
 Choose a random integer number 𝑒, such that 1 < 𝑒 < 𝛷(𝑛) and 
𝑔𝑐𝑑(𝑒, 𝛷(𝑛)) = 1. 
 Compute the private key 𝑑, such that 𝑑 = 𝑒−1 mod 𝛷(𝑛). 
 Public key is (𝑛, 𝑒) and private key is 𝑑. 
 
2. Encryption phase: This phase is carried out by a sender (Alice) who intends to 
send a message 𝑚 to the receiver (Bob). The details of this phase are as follows: 
 Get the receiver‟s public key (𝑛, 𝑒). 
 Represent the message as a positive integer 𝑚, 0 < 𝑚 < 𝑛. 
 Compute the encrypted message 𝑐 = 𝑚𝑒  mod 𝑛. 
 Send the encrypted message 𝑐 to the receiver. 
 
3. Decryption phase: This phase is generated by a receiver (Bob). The details of 
this phase are as follows: 
 Get the encrypted message 𝑐 from the sender. 
 Recover the original message 𝑚, 𝑚 = 𝑐𝑑  mod 𝑛. 
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Example 2.2 This is a working example of the RSA public-key encryption algorithm 
with small numbers. In this example, the receiver (Bob) chooses 𝑝 = 47, 𝑞 = 71, 
and computes 𝑛 = 𝑝 × 𝑞 = 47 × 71 = 3337 and 𝛷(𝑛) = (𝑝 − 1) × (𝑞 − 1) =
(47 − 1) × (71 − 1) = 3220. Also Bob chooses 𝑒 = 79 and computes the private 
key (decryption key) 𝑑 = 𝑒−1  mod 𝛷(𝑛) = (79)−1 mod 3220 = 1019. He sends 
his public key (𝑛, 𝑒) = (3337, 79) to sender. The sender (Alice) chooses the 
message 𝑚 = 688 and computes the encrypted message 𝑐 = 𝑚𝑒  mod 𝑛 =
(688)79 mod 3337 = 1570. She sends the encrypted message 𝑐 = 1570 to Bob. 
When Bob receives the encrypted message 𝑐, he uses his private key 𝑑 = 1019 to 
recover the message 𝑚, 𝑚 = 𝑐𝑑  mod 𝑛 = (1570)1019  mod 3337 = 688. 
  
2.1.2.2 ElGamal Public-Key Encryption Algorithm 
 
In 1985, Taher ElGamal (ElGamal, 1985) proposed an alternative to the RSA 
for both public-key encryption and digital signature. The ElGamal algorithm is based 
on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol therefore; the security of the ElGamal 
algorithm depends on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithms in a large 
prime modulus. The encryption in the ElGamal algorithm is probabilistic because the 
same plaintext gives a different ciphertext each time it is encrypted. Figure 2.5 shows 
the ElGamal public-key encryption protocol. 
 
